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3 August 1961

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DECISION ON JCS 1907/334 - 9172 Berlin 3100

A Note by the Secretaries (26 July 61)

on

UNITED STATES OUTLINE PLAN FOR BERLIN (U)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 1 August 1961, after making an amendment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 7 of JCS 1907/334.
2. Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 2 of the Annex, incorporating the amendment, and to destroy the superseded page in accordance with security regulations.
3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendix and Annex, was forwarded as JCSM-515-61, dated 3 August 1961, to the Secretary of Defense.
4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
5. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1907/334.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
 BY JCS ON 23 Aug 61
 CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED


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Pages 2385 - 2389, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

UNITED STATES OUTLINE PLAN FOR BERLIN (U)

The attached draft of a United States Outline Plan for Berlin, prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Council, with the assistance of Service Planners and the Joint Staff, is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COUNCIL

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on
UNITED STATES OUTLINE PLAN FOR BERLIN (C)

THE PROBLEM

1. To develop an outline plan which provides a national
concept of operations, and which will become the basis for
the several Departments and Agencies in the development of
their plans in support of the National Objective on Berlin.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. There is no single coordinated and approved national
plan relating to Berlin to which governmental Agencies
currently engaged in contingency planning can refer for
guidance and which can be used as the basis for the coordina-
tion of interdepartmental plans. Requirements have been
developed on a piecemeal basis to meet specific requests.

DISCUSSION

3. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin has
the responsibility of coordinating plans submitted by the
several Departments and Agencies.

4. It has been noted by the Representative of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group
on Berlin that there exists an urgent requirement for a
basic document which specifies the national tasks to be
accomplished, a concept of operations, and enumerates the
departmental tasks which must be accomplished.

5. Such a document is essential in order to provide the
basis for the development of comprehensive, coordinated plans
in support of the National Objective.

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CONCLUSION

6. A US outline plan for Berlin as described above should 1
be presented to the President for his approval as the basis 2
for the development of supporting Departmental plans and 3
actions with respect to Berlin. 4

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that: 5

a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, which reflects the 6
above conclusions, together with its Appendix and Annex 7
be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. 8

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of 9
unified or specified commands. 10

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers 11
assigned to NATO activities. 12

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US 13
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 14

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ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Outline Plan on Berlin (C)

- 1. There now exists no basic national document providing over-all planning guidance and prescribing tasks to be accomplished to achieve US objectives in the current Berlin situation. Such a document, with Presidential approval, would be valuable in providing the Departments and Agencies involved in planning with guidance in accomplishing the National Objective. 1
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- 2. Attached is a draft memorandum* to the Secretary of State which forwards for his comment a proposed "United States Outline Plan on Berlin" which outlines the national mission and tasks, concepts, departmental tasks, resources and coordinating measures. 8
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* Appendix

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Enclosure

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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: United States Outline Plan on Berlin (C)

1. There now exists no basic national document available to the several Departments and Agencies engaged in Berlin planning which provides over-all planning guidance to implement national tasks, a concept of operations during the several possible phases of the situation, and required departmental tasks.

2. Enclosed as an Annex hereto is a draft of such a document which when completed, and approved by the President, would provide the planning Agencies with a basic document assuring timely, coordinated and completely integrated action.

3. The following is suggested in connection with the enclosed:

a. Review by the State Department for additions and modification, as deemed desirable, to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7. (Paragraphs 5 and 6 to be completed in detail by necessary Departments and Agencies after 3c, below, has been completed.)

b. Based on State Department recommended changes (3a above) develop an agreed State Defense paper.

c. Presentation of an agreed paper to the President for approval.

d. Approved paper to be given to Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin to develop in conjunction with Departments and Agencies the details of paragraphs 5 and 6 in consonance with Presidential approved policies and concepts.

e. Upon completion of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the enclosed (subparagraph 3d above), the complete document to be resubmitted for Presidential approval. Upon final approval this document becomes the basic document from which Departmental and Agency planning plans are developed.

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ANNEX

UNITED STATES OUTLINE PLAN FOR BERLIN (C)

(8 pages)

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ANNEX

UNITED STATES OUTLINE PLAN FOR BERLIN (C)

1. General Situation

a. USSR and East Germany. The Soviets have indicated their intent to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, which may result in attempts to deprive the United States and Allies of their rights and prerogatives in Berlin as well as access to Berlin.

b. Tripartite. (Summary from NIE)

(1) France. France has indicated firmness on the Berlin question.

(2) The United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has shown a willingness to plan on the Berlin question, but as tensions grow, public pressures for negotiations will probably increase.

c. Other United States Allies (Summary from NIE).

(1) NATO (less tripartite nations). These nations would initially welcome and support United States leadership.

An undercurrent of misgiving would exist from the start. Cooperative planning would probably be supported, but as tension increased, signs would arise of unwillingness to resort to military action. Continuing pressure for negotiations would exist as well as full NATO consultation.

(2) Non-NATO non-Bloc nations. The majority of these nations view the Berlin questions as a power struggle irrelevant to their own concerns except as it threatens general war. Uncommitted nations, such as India, would press in the United Nations for a negotiated settlement. Local aversion to United States bases in nations such as Japan would intensify.

d. United States Position on Berlin. The United States will continue to make clear, as appropriate, to

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the USSR that the Western powers will maintain their position in Berlin and that Soviet Bloc measures challenging that position will be forcefully and promptly resisted and will have the gravest consequences.

e. United States Policy Toward NATO.

Current United States foreign policy holds NATO as the cornerstone. Details of US policy are contained in the NSC policy directive, "NATO and the Atlantic Nations," approved by the President on 21 April 1961.

2. Mission. The United States and her Allies will employ political, economical, psychological, and military means to:

- a. Assure the continued presence of Western forces in Berlin.
- b. Maintain the security and viability of West Berlin and physical access thereto.

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3. United States National Tasks

- a. Take political, economic, military and other measures necessary to prepare the United States to defeat the Sino-Soviet Bloc in general war.
- b. Improve the capability of United States armed forces to conduct nuclear and nonnuclear military operations.
- c. Influence our NATO allies to make commensurate improvement in their military capabilities and to support tripartite actions concerning Berlin.
- d. Develop concerted Tripartite (US/UK/France) actions designed to preserve Tripartite rights in and unrestricted access to Berlin.
- e. Seek solutions to the Berlin crisis by nonmilitary means.
- f. Exert political, economic, psychological and military pressures to convince the USSR of Allied determination.
- g. Seek favorable world opinion, especially among Allied and uncommitted nations.
- h. Be prepared to take appropriate action in support of East German uprisings.
- i. Prepare for and, when appropriate, execute reprisals and limited retaliatory actions.
- j. Be prepared to initiate use of appropriate military force.
- k. Be prepared for surprise nuclear attack.
- l. Be prepared to execute General War Plans.

4. Concept. While current interest is centered primarily upon the situation developing over Berlin, alertness must be maintained so that over-concentration on Berlin does not permit the Sino-Soviet Bloc to achieve successes elsewhere. With respect to Berlin, in particular, the crisis could develop from USSR and/or GDR military forces denying access to Berlin, by land and/or by air; or it might assume the nature of prolonged harassment or slow turnover to GDR personnel of duties currently performed by USSR personnel. In the latter case, replacement of USSR by GDR personnel in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) or closing

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autobahn or rail access for "repairs" will require governmental decisions as to which acts constitute interference with United States and Allied rights of access. This approach by the USSR might well erode access rights to the point where reprisals are justified without any single action being of sufficient magnitude to justify resorting to direct military conflict. Likewise, timing cannot be predicted. However, it can be visualized for planning purposes that the Berlin crisis could develop generally in the following three phases with the transition from Phase II to Phase III being possibly blurred:

a. Phase I - Present time to the signing of the peace treaty by the USSR and East Germany.

(1) The concept of this phase will be to impress the Soviets of United States and Allied determination to maintain rights and privileges with respect to Berlin. Diplomatic efforts in conjunction with Allies should be to prevent the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and East Germany, or if this is not possible, to influence the provisions of such a treaty by convincing the USSR of United States and/or Allied capabilities and determination to maintain its position in and access to Berlin. Political, economic, military and psychological measures will be implemented to increase readiness for general war. Strong efforts should be made to cultivate favorable Allied and world opinion. Mobilization of such resources as are authorized will be initiated. Measures for deployment of forces and such reserve component forces as may be available in support of general war and limited war would be implemented as necessary. Surveillance and retaliatory measures against the USSR and GDR will be taken as directed. Plans for covert and diversionary actions will be ready for use as may be directed. Forces will be brought to maximum readiness

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posture. Nations other than NATO, with whom the United States is aligned through bilateral or multilateral pacts will be informed of United States actions to the degree deemed necessary to assure their support in a limited or general war which may develop from the Berlin crisis.

Consultation with tripartite Allies and NATO in an effort to solve the Berlin crisis will continue. Civil defense measures must be intensified.

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b. Phase II - From the signing of a peace treaty to the interference by the USSR or East Germany with Allied rights in or unrestricted access to Berlin.

(1) The concept of this phase is to demonstrate by political, economic and military actions, United States determination to maintain rights and prerogatives in Berlin. Measures to increase readiness for general war will continue. Preparations and alertness for surprise attack will continue. Deployment of forces in support of both limited and general war, and mobilization of reserves and national resources will be continued. Consultation with Allies will be continued to develop approved multilateral plans of action. During this period use of all rights and privileges of access into and from Berlin will be increased. Harassing measures will be initiated, and appropriate reprisal measures against USSR and GDR will be continued. In concert with Allies, economic pressures will be applied against Bloc nations. Plans for covert actions will be completed. The United States will continue to seek a negotiated solution consistent with the national mission stated in paragraph 2, above, and without weakening essential Allied positions. Continuation of plans and actions initiated in Phase I.

c. Phase III - From the interference by the USSR or East Germany with Allied rights in and/or access to Berlin until the Allies re-establish such rights and access.

(1) The concept of this phase is to proceed deliberately by successive actions designed to re-establish the Allied rights with respect to Berlin. Preparations will continue to attain maximum readiness for general war and alertness for surprise attack will continue. Appropriate reprisals and harassing actions, political, economic, military and psychological, world-wide, will be undertaken. These measures should not be mere irritants but should be of

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sufficient magnitude to exert real pressure on the GDR and/or the USSR. Closest coordination with the Allies will be intensified. From the beginning of this phase and continuing until force is employed, the Allies will assert their rights for transit to and from Berlin by attempting to continue former normal procedures. The decision must be made that, after all measures short of direct military conflict have been exhausted, appropriate force will be used to maintain Berlin rights and to determine USSR/GDR intentions. These actions will be conducted on a scale and in a manner so as to convince the USSR that the United States and its Allies are willing to accept the consequences of general war rather than back down. These operations will not be concentrated on Berlin alone, but will include operations in other areas where our capabilities can bring meaningful pressures to bear on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. If this does not effect a change in the Soviet position, actions of greater scope on a global basis, including land, sea or air forces or a combination thereof, should be undertaken designed to confront the Soviets with the imminent possibility of general war. If these actions are not successful and/or they develop to such a degree as to endanger the Allied general war posture, a prompt decision will have to be made to employ tactical nuclear weapons or to initiate general war. Throughout this phase greatest emphasis must be placed on the readiness of Allies to negotiate in a way that preserves the national mission in paragraph 2, above, but still retaining essential Allied positions.

5. Departmental and agency tasks (sample items shown for two departments only):

a. Department of Defense will:

(1) Phase I

(a) Prepare plans and, when directed, request necessary funds.

(b) Prepare plans and, when directed, mobilize and deploy forces.

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(c) Prepare military plans, unilateral and combined.

(2) Phase II

(a) Continue Phase I actions as appropriate.

(b) Be prepared, when directed, to execute reprisal and harassing actions.

(3) Phase III

(a) Continue Phase I and II actions as appropriate.

(b) Be prepared, when directed, to implement limited and/or general war plans.

b. Department of State will:

(1) Phase I

(a) Prepare plans, and when directed, negotiate with Allies for support of United States national plans.

(b) Prepare plans, and when directed, negotiate with Allies for an economic blockade of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(c) Prepare plans, and when directed, seek a solution in conjunction with Allies for a non-military solution to the Berlin problem.

(2) Phase II

(a) Continue Phase I actions as appropriate.

(b) Prepare plan, and when directed, dispatch a note to USSR covering proposed United States and Allied actions.

(3) Phase III

Continue Phase I and II actions as appropriate.

c. Treasury Department

d. Central Intelligence Agency

e. Office of Civil Defense Mobilization

f. United States Information Agency

g. etc.

6. Resources. Necessary plans for required resources (personnel, funds, etc.) will be developed by the several departments and agencies in support of approved operational guidance.

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7. Coordination.

a. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group is responsible to the President and the National Security Council for effecting complete coordination and consistency in the development of necessary plans and actions generated by Government departments and agencies in support of national policy with respect to the Berlin situation. In this connection it will:

(1) Develop an appropriate timetable to coordinate the actions of the departments and agencies.

(2) Effect coordination among the several plans developed by the departments and agencies.

(3) Coordinate the departmental or agency presentation of plans submitted to the President for his approval.

(4) Monitor the execution of presidentially approved plans and submit to the President periodic progress reports.

(5) Be prepared to function as the Executive Department Coordination Center for the Berlin situation.

b. This group (ICG) will in no way contravene or duplicate the statutory responsibilities and functions of the departments, agencies or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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A Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Council
on

UNITED STATES OUTLINE PLAN FOR BERLIN (C)

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

Holders of JCS 1907/334 are requested to substitute the attached revised pages 2385, 2386, and 2386a and to destroy the superseded pages 2385 and 2386 in accordance with security regulations

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SECOND CORRIGENDUM

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THIRD CORRIGENDUM

Holders of JCS 1907/334 are requested to substitute the attached revised pages 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and added page 4a of the Annex, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

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Joint Secretariat

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

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(26 July 61)

A Note by the Secretaries

on

UNITED STATES OUTLINE PLAN FOR BERLIN (C)

The attached memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 21 October 1961, subject: "United States Outline Plan on Berlin," is circulated for information.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

21 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: United States Outline Plan on Berlin

The proposed Outline Plan on Berlin* forwarded by JCSM-515-61** of 3 August 1961 has been thoroughly studied in my office and discussed at some length with representatives of the Department of State. There is general agreement that the suggestion for a government-wide planning document has much merit. However, the following practical considerations which cast doubt on the usefulness of such a plan at the present stage of the Berlin crisis have been given special emphasis by the State Department representatives:

a. There is some question as to the feasibility of incorporating all the ramifications of the fast-moving Berlin problem in a single brief document. The political situation, in particular, is susceptible to such shifting developments as would almost certainly continually invalidate much of the document.


b. The plan would have to assume U.S. policy positions on highly sensitive and far-reaching matters that have not yet been adequately elaborated and analyzed.

c. A substantial amount of the time and energies of our Berlin planning and operational organization would have to be diverted from pressing tasks in order to draw up and continually up-date the planning document. The expected gain from implementing this proposal would not appear to be sufficient to offset such a diversion of effort.

* Annex to JCS 1907/334
** Enclosure to JCS 1907/334

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In view of these reservations, I do not feel that it would be worthwhile for the Defense Department to press this matter further at the present time.

/s/ ROBERT S. McNAMARA

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